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Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between technology and the policies that govern 
competition in the local telephone business. Analysis of competition policies requires a "long 
run" modeling perspective in which not only the entry and exit of firms are allowed but also 
allowed are changes in the nature of the investment in the underlying network technology such 
as network backbone and its topology. This long run perspective requires a focus on the sources 
and conditions of joint production and public goods that exist in the production process and how 
they are influenced by the finance of the business and the constraints policies place on firms to 
provide services that are not profitable. 
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Introduction 
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 established the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) with the mandate "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United 
States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio commi.mications service 
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.'' In practice this mandate has involved various 
forms of price regulation, entry regulations, and "universal service" regulations on the scope and 
definition of service. Currently, public policy debate is focused on ways to substitute 
competition for regulation as a means of disciplining the activities of companies that have, in the 
past, been viewed as natural monopolies. 
This paper explores the relationship between technology and regulation in the local telephone 
business. The way that competition can be used, and the window through which it can enter, 
depends on the nature of the technology. A model is developed that is an attempt to capture the 
technological aspects of providing telephony services. In tum the analysis becomes focused on 
the implication of regulations designed to increase the use of competition, and their interaction 
with universal service policies. 
Analysis of competition policies, which involve the entry and exit of firms, faces a change in 
perspective from the "short run" to the "long run". Not only does scale of plant become an 
important variable, but so also does the network architectures and the scope of services. 
Investment in telephony is a continuous matter that is motivated by ever changing technology 
and population dynamics. A polic;y of competiti0n and industry entry is deeply associated with 
the continuous nature of investment. The problem must be viewed as one of proper investment 
in technology choices and the analysis must incorporate the possibility of major resource 
deployment decisions. 
The question posed is related to the impact of policies of competition on resource employment 
decisions that ultimately dictate the scope and quality of service. The analysis suggests that 
regulators must acknowledge the role of common costs. The existence of large sunk costs in the 
telecommunications industry is well known and is typically associated with economies of scale. 
The analysis of optimal pricing and regulation of a monopolist with sunk common costs is also 
1 The financial support of Pacific Bell is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of Rick Emmerson, Bruce 
Jamison, John Ledyard, Rex Mitchell and Mary Shugard have been very helpful. 
analyzed in Baumol, Panzer and Willig (1982), Sharkey (1984), Laffont and Tirole (1994-b)2• 
The analysis presented here views the problem from a different perspective. Sunk costs in the 
sense of scale economies are not simply the source of a cost recovery problem. Common costs 
are a problem that extend themselves beyond traditional analysis and are exacerbated by certain 
important regulations such as a universal service requirement. 
An outline of the paper is as follows. Section One reviews the current policy objectives of 
telecommunications regulation. Section Two presents the policy options available to regulators 
once competition is introduced. Section three introduces a model of the underlying technology. 
The model is used to derive the cost function outlined in Section Four. In Section Five the 
regulator's optimization problem is solved. How this optimum can be used to guide efficient 
entry is discussed. With the optimum as a benchmark specific combinations of entry policy and 
universal service policy are examined and evaluated in Sections Six and Seven. The final 
Section Eight, is a discussion of conclusions. 
I. POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Four policy objectives will be considered. The first objective is universal service (US). In 
practice this mandate has been given several interpretations. At the most basic level it means a 
ubiquitous telephone network. The network must have the capacity to reach people in all 
geographic locations, and the provider must stand ready to provide this service to all potential 
customers. At a second level the US objective has meant the provision of public service 
infrastructure such as 9I I service, directory assistance, call tracing, and public pay phones. A 
further interpretation of US is the requirement of affordability. Thus the US objective means that 
the network is to be both available to all and widely used. The goal is demonstrated by all of the 
following: the lower pricing of household lines relative to business lines, the subsidized 
"lifeline" service rates for low income groups, and the persuasiveness of averaging. Averaging 
means that rural prices do not reflect their higher cost over urban customers and that the · 
uniform rates are based on average costs of serving all customers. Finally, the minimum 
required services are based on US definitions that are not static, but grow over time. For 
example, originally touch tone was considered a premium service, but now it is con~idered part 
of basic service in some jurisdictions. Similarly, today technology is being placed that more 
easily allows widespread broadband capability. Over time the universal service definition might 
change to include greater bandwidth than is necessary for simple voice service. Thus the 
changing definitions of US, and the anticipation of such changes, requires new and ongoing 
investments. 
The US objective has an immediate implication. If the rate to households is below the cost of 
providing service to those households then the LEC will experience a loss. As will be 
determined in the paper below, this regulatory requirement has major implication for costs and 
the general conditions under which competition will be successful. 
2 While the focus of Laffont and Tirole is similar to ours in many respects, they do not focus on the long run 
investment implications of policy, the dynamics of efficiency and the interactions that exist among entry and 
technology. See also Laffont and Tirole ( 1994-a) 
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The second objective is the viability of the local exchange carrier (LEC). The LEC typically 
serves as a regulated monopolist and represents a substantial investment by the community in 
terms of both capital and in terms of services to the community. The rates are regulated so 
losses are experienced in some markets. These losses must be recovered from somewhere, 
otherwise the LEC will not be viable and will cease to exist. 
The third objective reflects a policy of uniform prices for a given class of service. That is, costs 
are computed according to a geographic average and from this geographic average cost a 
uniform rate is determined. Markets in which the same class of service is delivered are required 
to be presented with the same rates. The policy interacts with the two previous policies by 
creating the existence of "cross subsidies" among markets. Some markets receive rate 
"subsidies" in the sense that the rates are below the cost of serving the market and these 
subsidies are acquired from the rates charged other markets where the rates are high relative to 
costs. 
The fourth objective is market efficiency. Efficiency exists in two forms. The first is production 
efficiency: the cost of operations should reflect the most economical way to provide services. 
The second is pricing efficiency: prices should be set in a manner that exerts the least possible 
burden on the population subject to covering the cost of production. Production efficiency 
implies that if competition is allowed then entry should be efficient. That is, the entrant should 
be a firm tha:t can provide the service on at least the same efficient terms as can the LEC. 
Additionally, production efficiency implies that there should be efficient timing and 
coordination of investments. The need for investments in terms of use do not necessarily 
coincide with the opportunities in terms of cost savings. Sometimes investment in one period is 
justified by its cost saving properties in later periods. The installation of new technologies such 
as fiber for example, might be less expensive when undertaken along with other installations 
(replacing copper wire) even though the new technology will not be called upon for use until 
much later. 
Efficient investment means that policies should encourage the LEC to invest when such 
investment captures efficiencies related to time and timing. This objective has important 
implications for the background assumptions on which the paper rests. The regulators should 
not follow entry policies that prevent the LEC from recovering costs. Under some conditions 
sunk cost will cause lower marginal cost. If rates are determined only by marginal cost, without 
due consideration for the investment that caused the lowered marginal cost, then an increased 
investment outlay will be met only by lower rates and subsequent losses. The objective of 
efficient investment reflects the fact that policies that do not honor the prior commitment of 
investment recovery implicit in sunk costs, will have the long run effect of discouraging 
investment by regulated firms. Similarly, a policy that requires aLEC to sell services to a 
competitor at marginal cost, regardless of any sunk investment cost that has not been recovered, 
will not promote efficient investment. 
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2. POLICY OPTIONS 
Given the complexity of the policy objectives above, several policy options need be explored. In 
particular the role and type of price regulations, the conditions of entry and the administration of 
any universal service mechanism arise. This section outlines the options available. 
The primary goal of competition is to replace the role of regulatory constraints on prices. 
However given the multiple policy objectives, two pricing issues arise. First, how should the 
LEC be allowed to respond to competition? In particular regulators need to examine the extent 
to which the LEC should be allowed to respond with lower prices in markets that attract entry, 
and the extent to which the LEC can raise prices in markets that do not attract competition. 
Second, as entry is unlikely to be uniform across markets, it undermines the uniform pricing 
policy. Thus the policy issue arises, to what extent should there be regulations that enforce the 
same prices for the same class of service be uniform across geographic regions. If such 
regulations remain, should they bind only the LEC or all service providers? 
The second class of policy options concerns the nature of competition. A policy must identify 
what set of markets entry will be allowed, and on what terms. Given that the LEC has invested 
in the current public network infrastructure, the terms of access to this infrastructure must be 
determined, and in particular, the formulation of the access fees, if any, must be specified. 
Several fee calculation policy options exist. One would be to allow a process of bargaining 
between the LEC and the entrant to determine the fee. A second option is to calculate an access 
fee based on the marginal cost of entry, so that the entrant is responsible for the incremental cost 
to the network of providing the service to its customers. Another alternative is to use distributed 
cost, where the entrant's access fee would be set at a level that covers some share of the common 
costs of the network, in addition to incremental cost. Finally there is the proposal to use the 
efficient component pricing rule which suggest that access fees should be set to exactly cover the 
~orgone net revenue of the LEC on the services that it no longer and the entrant now provides. 
The overall policy must. acknowledge interdependencies that exist. If the universal service 
policy is tenable under competition, how is the universal service goal to be implemented? That 
is, what universal service mechanism is to be put in place? Policy options include: (i) keeping 
the LEC as the only firm bound by universal service obligations, (ii) requiring entrants to be 
obliged to offer universal service in any market entered, or (iii) allowing carriers to opt in or out 
of the universal service mechanism. If the last option is adopted, should an auction or some other 
approach be used to allocate these obligations to the carriers? 
If a separate universal service fund is to be put in place, several additional policy issues arise. 
The first issue is the size of the fund. That is, how should the cost of universal service be 
defined? Again, this raises the issue of what is the appropriate notion of costs, and to answer 
that question the underlying technology must be examined. Having settled upon the appropriate 
size of the fund, then a policy must determine how it is to be administered. Who pays into the 
fund and who can draw on it must be determined by policy. Then, the issue of administration 
must be addressed. Policy options include, the establishment of an explicit tax subsidy 
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mechanism, where taxes are set to raise an amount to cover the cost of the fund, and carriers 
then request disbursements from the fund to cover the cost of their universal service obligations. 
Alternatively, transaction could be undertaken directly between carriers. A final possibility is, 
akin to the current system, to have no explicit mechanism, so that each carrier is responsible for 
its own universal service obligations and the necessary accounting transactions are undertaken 
within each firm. 
3. TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION 
The technology in the telephone industry involves many aspects of joint production, some of 
which are not explored extensively in the literature. The implications of the joint production 
relationships are that common costs exist, which must be covered. The specific nature of these 
common costs are influenced by regulations such as the universal service requirements. As a 
result the classical notions of marginal and incremental cost must be modified when used as 
tools to design policies that will govern the relationship between the LEC and entrants, should 
competition be allowed. That is, the allocation of the common cost must be carefully considered 
since it has implications for all aspects of the industry when operating in a competitive 
environment. 
The source of the common costs lie deep within the nature of the technology and the regulations. 
The joint production arises from two related features of the telephone technology. First the LEC 
installs technology like the wiring in a network that can be used by collections of individuals in 
different locations that use the technology under different conditions. This network is known as 
the local access and transport area (LATA). Secondly, the technology installed by the LEC can 
be used for different services. The first part of the discussion of technology will focus on the 
LATA and the second will focus on the scope of services that a telephone company might 
provide. As will be demonstrated below, both of these sources are influenced by regulations. 
Figure I will help with the exposition. Shown there is a LATA that consists of several markets 
that are connected through a basic "network backbone" shown as the think solid line in the 
figure. The network backbone can be viewed as a wi"re configured as shown \\lith wires 
extending to the individual markets. The thick black boxes represent switches. 
Let M = the number of markets. For the example in the Figure I, M = 10. Markets A,B,C,D, 
and E consist of five households each. The households in each market are connected by a 
dedicated line to a Serving Area Interface (SAl) that is connected to a switch in the network 
backbone. At the bottom of the figure are five additional markets consisting of one household 
each. Collectively these latter five markets will be called F. Each of the sub-markets can be 
viewed as having a "local line" that connects the individual households/ markets to a switch in 
the network backbone of the LATA. 
The Figure shows two of the infinite possible locations of the network backbone, the solid lines 
denoted by WR0 , and the dashed double lines wR'. The architecture wR' is built around a larger 
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A 
network backbone with more switches. As is clear from the picture the larger is the network 
backbone together with the additional switches, the less line is required to connect the network 
backbone to the individual markets. This carries the idea that different network backbone 
architectures change the resources required for the connection of the individual markets. This 
tradeoff between the resource enhancements of the network backbone (more fiber and switches) 
on one hand and on the other hand the resources required to provide services to individual 
markets, is important for discussions of incremental costs. The tradeoff is not only characteristic 
of location. 
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As will be discussed later, the tradeoff is also a property of augmented services that are enabled 
by technology. So, while the initial notation and discussion will take place in terms of location 
variables, it is clear that the analysis extends itself to many other facets of the telephone 
business. 
W R = miles of wire used in the network backbone. In a sense, the notation, W R , can be used to 
capture different network backbones. 
WR0 is the minimal acceptable location as dictated by policy and technology. 
W = miles of wire from the local market m to a connection to the backbone. 
m 
W m 0 = The amount of wire, W m ,required to connect market m to the network backbone if only 
the minimal acceptable location of the backbone, WR0, is installed. 
ZmCW R) = the offset of W m that occurs with a different backbones, indexed by W R • 
Equation ( 1) makes explicit a possible functional relationships between the activities facilitating 
an expanded backbone and the activities associated with the local markets. As will be explained 
later, this is the heart of a "public good" feature that leads to common costs. 
In addition to the technological relationships, the capacity of the LATA to carry traffic is 
modeled as being governed by two different types of constraints. The first is an organizational 
or administrative constraint. The second is a technological capacity constraint. These two types 
of activities represent different ways in which the overall capacity of the system is determined. 
They each have different consequences in terms of cost. Let 
X= total traffic in th~ LATA measured in hundred call seconds (ccs), and let 
X =the traffic associated with market m. Recall, M is the set of all markets. m . 
Administrative activities are modeled as depending upon the total volume of traffic in the 
LATA The more the total volume of traffic, the more pressure is placed on administrative 
functions. Let 
Y A= resources devoted to administrative activities, and let 
A(Y A) be the capacity of the organization to deal with administrative matters, which depend on 
the amount of administrative resources in place. 
The inequality (2) says that the total amount of traffic that can occur in the LATA, measured as 
the sum of traffic in individual markets, is constrained by the level of administrative 
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organization. The inequality is appropriate because from time to time administrative slack might 
exist. The sum is appropriate because of the direct relationship between the level of traffic and 
billing and related activities that require administrative attention. 
The second capacity variable is the physical ability of the LATA to carry traffic. This physical 
ability can come in many forms but the switch and the minimal size and frequency of the 
repeaters that connect the local markets to the network backbone will be the focus here. These 
variables dictate the maximum traffic that can occur in the local market at any given time 
without degradation of service. Let 
Y5 =the minimal sized switches used in the connections with the local markets and let S(Ys) be 
the maximal traffic that can be carried given the switch size. 
Equation (3) simply requires that the traffic in any market not exceed the amount allowed by the 
technology choices. Switch capacity is measured in terms of number of simultaneous 
connections and transport capacity is measured in kilobits per second. 
Figure 2 is useful. It illustrates the nature of the constraints. The model is a combination of 
parametric programming and classical production theory. First notice that for markets 1 and 2 to 
get any services at all, they must be connected to the network. Switch capacity limits the level 
of traffic in any market independent of traffic in other markets. Administrative capacity limits 
the level of traffic in the whole system so heavy activity in one market might limit the 
administrative capacity to serve other markets. 
An important aspect of production and cost is not covered in the discussion above. Regulation 
might require that a company meet the condition of carrier of last resort. This means that the 
company must meet a universal service obligation of providing service to all that want it, 
regardless of the cost or the ability and desire of people to pay. This obligation is shown in 
Figure 2 as constraints on the minimal service that a market must have. That is, the minimal 
service that can be offered to a market is the quantity X0 • Formally, each market, m,. must satisfy 
the constraint 
This model of a universal service requirement carries the notion that institutional obligations can 
enter the service providing process like a constraint. 
It is clear that the decisions of the optimal configuration of the network backbone will be 
influenced by the condition of universal service. If aLEC is able to operate without such a 
constraint the LATA might have a much different configuration and thus the whole structure of 
systems costs would be different. 
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OBSERVATION 1. The LEC and an entrant have fundamentally different cost structures 
because of the US requirement. 
The observation is so obvious that it hardly needs support; but, it is nevertheless important for 
policies that govern competition. The backbone network of the LEC is developed under the US 
constraint. Suppose for example that the LEC was not required to serve the individual markets F 
in Figure 1. The feeder and the switch located near F could obviously be eliminated and the 
associated cost avoided. Because the feeder and switch are not used, the other parts of the 
network would be reconfigured in response. That is, the network that serves the other markets 
reflects the fact that the entire network is configured to serve F. 
The discussion above proceeded on the assumption that the LEC provides only one type of 
service while in fact the LEC provides many different types of services and the interaction of 
these services has an important impact on the nature of costs and the consequent implications of 
entry and competition. In some cases it is possible for the equipment to perform several different 
types of functions. As a result a type of joint production can exist in which the provision of 
some services can be seen as a "by-product" of the provision of others. For example, consider 
the upgrade of switching and signaling systems from analog to digital. As digital equipment is 
installed the system develops the capacity to carry high speed data such as primary rate ISDN 
and other ISDN traffic while at the same time the basic "voice" traffic can still be carried. 
Deploying the new digital technology enhances the amount of basic voice traffic or pots (plain 
old telephone service) traffic that can be carried, but at the same time lowers the difficulty, 
relative to the older technology, of providing augmented services such as "call return" or 
"repeat dialing" and allows specialized products to be provided. Similarly replacing copper with 
fiber increases capacity and enhances the ability to offer video or high speed data transmission. 
The point to be gained from the analysis, as will be demonstrated, is that the incremental cost of 
providing any of these services is then dependent on the level of the other services provided. 
In order to avoid excessive notation to capture the different types of traffic in a market, the x 
~ariables will assume the role of both actual traffic and some sort of potential traffic as called for 
by the discussion. No attempt will be made to integrate these new variables with the variables 
that have been introduc~d above. The method of achieving that integration should be obvious 
from the previous and following discussions. 
Only two types of service will be explored and these will be called "basic service" such as voice 
traffic, which will be represented by a "b" and "augmented services" such as high speed data for 
example, which will be represented by a "v". 
Y" =resources identified with the provision of basic system services. In this case it would be 
analog switches that could be supplemented with digital to analog converter units, which would 
permit the transmission of digital through an analog system. 
Yv = special resources identified with system augmentations to support scope. The example is 
digital switches. 
The Yv technology is such that, once it is in place, it can perform functions necessary to provide 
either or both types of service, basic or augmented. On the other hand theY" resources are such 
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that they can be used to produce basic services but they must be used in great quantities to 
produce the augmented services if they can be used to produce them at all. Production functions 
can be used to represent the relationships. 
Sb( Yb, YJ =capacity of system to carry basic services (voice) 
Sv( Yb, YJ =capacity of system to carry scope augmented services (ISDN/video) 
xm b = basic service traffic available (or existing in) to market m 
xm v = augmented service traffic available (or existing in) to market m. 
xmb ~ Sb (Yb ' YJ 
xmv:::;; Sv (Yb , YJ 
Figure 3 might help with an explanation. First consider the capacity of the LEC to provide 
augmented services as it adds each of the two different types of resources. The isoquants of the 
production function Sv(Yb,YJ are represented by the solid lines (these are made linear simply out 
of convenience). First, notice that the augmented service, Sv , can be provided by either building 
equipment through the application of Yb or Yv. However, if only Yb is used to produce the 
augmented service, it is very expensive. That is, the augmented service Sv can only be provided 
at very low levels and only with the application of a large quantity of Yb. This is shown as the 
solid line isoquants intersect the horizontal axis only at very high levels of Yb. The fact that the 
solid lines are horizontal means that upper limits exist to the amount of augmented services that 
can be provided through the addition of switches and necessary adjunct units (Yb). The higher 
levels of the service activity can only be provided through the application of the specialized 
resources Y v. Regardless of the Y b added, it is not possible to get the higher levels of 
augmented service Sv (. , .). 
Now consider the activity of providing basic services Sb. The isoquants of the function Sb(Yb,Y) 
are represented by the dotted lines indicating that basic service can be produced by the 
application of either resource. The isoquants for basic services are on the same graph because the 
basic service in this technology are like a by-product of producing the augmented service. The 
inputs are like "public goods" which jointly produce the two outputs. The technical 
relationships are like beef and hide (the outputs) that result from the application of the· inputs, 
cattle, water, food, etc. -
A review of the technology model reveals structure that will have implications for the next 
section on costs. It is captured by the following observation. 
OBSERVATION 2. The network system involves three different types of activities that fall into 
the broad categories of "joint products/public goods/commons". 
A close look at the relationships defined by equations ( 1 ), (2) and (3) will reveal some familiar 
constructions. Equation (1) forms the heart of a "public good" relationship between the 
properties of the network backbone and the expenditures for the connection with the several 
local markets. Notice that the input variable, W R , exists in the equation that defines each of the 
input variables W m through the benefit of the variable Zm(W R). That is, W R is operating like a 
"public good". 
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Similarly, both of the variables Y~ andY, enter each of the outputs S~ and Sv. Thus both operate 
like public goods. The variables A and S could be viewed as "intermediate goods" but such an 
unqualified interpretation ignores the "public goods" aspects that will ultimately be the source of 
common costs. Equation (2) defines a private goods relationship in which the amount used by 
one activity reduces the amount available for other activities. Because of the additive 
relationship the quantity, A, can be allocated to the individual markets in a classical manner.' 
Equation (3) is like a "peak load" capacity problem. This variable has the property that it does 
) However, if the function A(Y ,) is nonlinear, there can be problems allocating theY" to the different markets for 
the same reason that such problems are encountered in any economies of scale problem. 
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not place constraints in an additive manner but restricts the total that any one market can place 
on the system. While it is technically different from the public goods problem it causes similar 
allocation problems. 
4. COSTS 
Costs are divided into three categories: investment or capital costs, administrative costs, and 
market/customer specific costs. Investment/capital costs is the money spent on the switches and 
the capacity or location of the network backbone. That is: (where P wm is the local cost of wire 
needed to hook market m) 
For ease of exposition a different notation will be used. The price variables will be replaced by 
resource cost variables. Thus the investment cost becomes defined as: 
Administrative cost is simply the price of administrative services times the amount of services 
employed. Of course, aspects of administrative costs could be categorized as "fixed or sunk" but 
that possibility will not be explored here. In summary: 
Administrative cost= PA YA = CA(A). 
A market specific variable cost is added for completeness. It can be viewed as depending upon 
the traffic in a particular market along with the number of households in the market. It is 
captured by the function: 
Market specific vari(!ble cost= LmeM Cm( Nm, Xm), where N is the number of hookups in the 
market area . 
Total cost is the sum of these three categories of cost. That is, 
total cost = investment cost+ administrative cost + market specific variable cost. 
The problem of common cost can be clearly seen from the components of total cost and the 
relationships that were defined in the previous section. Those activities that constitute the 
investment costs do not contribute to the cost of any one market. The cost CwR for example, 
measure part of the cost of the network backbone and is not associated with any particular 
market. Similarly the cost of switches cannot be associated with a market. Of course it might be 
possible to express the input variables as optimal configurations of desired outputs but in the 
cases of joint products there is no guarantee that the derivatives needed for expressing marginal 
costs exist (by virtue of the physical requirements that certain variables must move together). 
As can be seen from the definitions the costs that can be clearly associated with an individual 
market or service might be but a small part of the overall cost structure. Nevertheless, certain 
approaches to policy, especially in the case of potentially entering competitors, motivate 
attempts to so allocate costs. The first concept to be defined is distributed cost. The second 
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concept examined is marginal cost, which varies with the volume of the output. Following that 
will be a discussion of incremental costs that vary with the addition of markets or services. The 
observations will highlight some of the problems with these definitions. 
Distributed costs reflect a clear attempt to allocate all common costs. In terms of the variable 
defined above the distributed cost to some market m will be DCm . While many formulas exist 
that can accomplish the allocation, the most common is simply an average across markets. The 
definition of distributed cost of market m thus becomes 
That is, the total common cost is allocated proportionately to each market. The treatment of 
administrative cost can be modified as it is below in the discussion of incremental cost. Of 
course the arbitrary nature of this allocation is obvious from the proportionality. Any method of 
allocating might serve as well. 
OBSERVATION 3. The existence of common costs create ambiguity in the notions of marginal 
cost. 
In order to make the problem isolated by Observation 3 clear, the example in Figure 3 will be 
used. Suppose that the decision is made to use Yv alone. Outputs are then measured as 
movements along the vertical axis intersect the solid and dotted lines of the two outputs. 
Suppose that substantial levels of Sv are sold and less Sb is sold. In this case the marginal cost of 
Sb could be defined to be zero. But, the situation is symmetric. Suppose that Sb was sold in 
great amounts with only small amounts of Sv, much less than capacity. Then one would be 
tempted to measure the marginal cost of Sv as zero. Similar problems exist with any attempt to 
define incremental costs associated with whether or not one of the services is provided. As will 
be shown in the next section, marginal cost is not an appropriate concept for pricing policy in the 
presence of joint products like these. The ambiguity identified in this observation simply 
suggests what will be shown later. 
The operational concepts found in policies carry the same intuition as marginal cost but.differ by 
virtue of the discreteness found in operating environments, the problems of measurement and the 
role of time in decisions. The operational aspects of policy have thus forced the evolution of 
definition into the concept of "incremental cost" that is intended to capture the costs that might 
be attributed to the addition of a market or some other discrete unit. Several different definitions 
of incremental cost exist that reflect the different perspectives that time places on analysis. 
OBSERVATION 4. The existence of common costs create ambiguity in the notions of 
incremental costs. 
incremental cost (market removal concept). ICm'. refers to the cost that would be avoided if a 
market is removed from service. In terms of the notation that has been used above it is: 
ICm'=Cm(Nm,Xm)+CA(A: m's traffic included)-CA(A: m's traffic excluded) 
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incremental cost (market addition concept), Icm• ,refers to the cost would be added if the market 
is added to the current backbone network. This would include all costs of connecting the market 
to the network without consideration of the fact that such cost depends upon the nature and 
location of the network that has been put in place. In terms of the notation that has been used 
above it is: 
incremental (actual/system constraint concept) provides the proper perspective from which the 
problems can be viewed because it emphasizes a fundamental and important shortcoming of 
concepts of incremental cost. Capital and investment costs stem from decisions about the 
network backbone architecture and capacity. These decisions are made in recognition of the 
simultaneous existence of several markets. Thus the actual/system incremental cost is the cost 
difference between a baseline configuration and the configuration that would result if the market 
under consideration is added. Thus, the concept recognizes the influence that the market in 
question has on both the system network backbone architecture and capacity. Considerations of 
this nature are necessary in order that the concept of incremental cost capture some part of the 
joint costs that are generated by the network. Notice, however, that even this concept of 
incremental cost does not capture the full nature of the common cost that exist by virtue of the 
network technology. 
lfthe baseline is set at some minimal network backbone, WR0 , that is to be expanded only as a 
result of the addition of market m, then the cost would be 
Notice that this cost still neglects the important common cost C5(S). So, even this measure of 
incremental cost has shortcomings as a measure of operations and individual market costs. The 
choice of baseline is also a source of ambiguity. For example, whether or not to include the US 
requirement as part of the minimal cost, CwR(W R''), against which the cost of the backbone is 
computed is critical. 
5. ENTRY AND PRICE REGULATION: OPTIMALITY BENCHMARKS 
The classical problem studied in the literature is one of a regulated firm with large fixed costs, 
serving several markets. If the firm sets a single price at marginal cost then the firm could either 
experience profits or losses. The regulator aims to find the set of prices that maximizes the sum 
of the consumers' welfare, subject to the firm just breaking even including the opportunity of the 
cost of capital. The resulting prices, called Ramsey prices, reflect the so called "inverse elasticity 
rule." That is, price in each market should be raised above marginal cost in proportion to the 
inverse of the market elasticity. 
A major aspect of the classical Ramsey approach is that fixed cost and common costs must be 
covered by a single price per unit as opposed to lump sum charges or even two part charges that 
are independent of the quantity consumed. An alternative approach is to levy a Jump sum charge 
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to cover the fixed cost and common costs. In this case the markup is replaced by the fixed 
charge. The discussion will incorporate both approaches. 
Formally, the model can be developed directly by use of the utility functions or it can be 
developed by use of the consumer surplus model. They are the same under the technical 
conditions that 'are commonly assumed. 4 For ease of exposition the consumer surplus model will 
be used here. The Ramsey prices are found as a solution to the following problem. Let Pm(Xm) 
be the market demand function in market m in which price is expressed as a function of quantity. 
The other variables are as defined in the sections above. For purposes of preliminary analysis 
the markets will be divided into two classes M1 ~nd ~· The M1 class of markets are those for 
which the demand function is "operative" in the sense that at the optimum quantity of available 
service, (Xm), the demand function indicates the marginal value. The class M2 is different in that 
service is made available beyond the desire or the ability of the market to pay. Thus, the 
4 Assume that individual i in market m has the quasi-linear utility function t'}lm(XIm) + Y 1m where the variable Y 1m is 
a commodity unrelated to the activities of the LEC and it has a price of 1. The income of the individual is Mim and 
the lump sum charge levied on each individual in market m is tm. The social optimization problem is 
maximization of the sum of individual utilities (including budget constraints and incentive constraints) 
I:mEMI I:;em [i}im(Xim) + y 1m+ A.im ( p m xim + y im + tm- Mlm )] + I:mEMJ :E,em"-1im (t}im(Xim)'-P m) 
plus producer surplus 
+ I:mEMI I:iem pm xlm +I:mEMI I:,em tm- I:MI+M2 Cm(Nm, I,Xim)- I:MI+M2 cmWLC:Wm0 - ZmfWR))- CWRfWR)- CA(A)- Cs(S) 
plus the Ramsey profit constraint (and associated multiplier) 
+An ( I:Mt Pm I,XIm + I:mEMt I:,em tm- I:Mt+M2Cm- I:MI+M2Cmwt.- CwR-CA(A)-Cs{S)) 
plus the technical constraints including universal service 
+A.A(I:MI+M2 I, x .. - A)+l:MIA.S m(I, xim -S)+l:M2A.Sm(I, xun -S)+I:MI+M2A,,m(Xo-I,Xim). 
Now, to see the implication for the formulation in the text, use the individual utility function, the budget 
constraint and the incentive constraint to rewrite the quasi-linear utility function as an integral under the 
individual demand curve for X plus the utility obtained by spending all money that remains toY. The expression 
is 
f X;m Pm(q..,)dq .. + M..,- tm-PmX ... 
After the individuals are aggregated to formulate a market level variable Xm, the negative terms- tm-PmXim are 
canceled by the same positive terms representing producer surplus. Making the appropriate substations and 
substituting 
into the Ramsey profit constraint, the formulation becomes as it is in the text. 
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demand price is 0 in the ranges of service that will be offered. The class M 2 are the markets for 
which the minimal service provided, X0 , is beyond what would be demanded in the market but 
is nevertheless made available. Of course different formulations of this property are possible but 
the current one is easy to use for discussion purposes and it follows directly from the use of 
quasi-linear utility functions. 
Max [L.MI JXm Pm(qm)dqm 
0 
- :r.MI+M2 em(Nm,Xm)- :r.Ml+M2 emWLrwm0 - Zm(y{R))- ewRfWR)- eA(A)- Cs(S) + A,A (L.MI+M2 xm- A)+ 
:r.MI.A,Sm (Xm- S) +L.M2 A,sm (Xm- S) +L.MI+M2'Aum ( Xo- Xm) +'An ( :r.MI pm xm + :r.mEMJ Nm tm- :r.Ml+M2em-
:r,Mt+M2Cm WL- ewR - e/A) - es(S) )]. 
The problem is to maximize consumer surplus subject to the constraint that the profits are zero. 
Note that the consumer utility L.M 1 J :m P m(qm)dqm is summed only over M 1 • This is because it is 
assumed that the optimal levels of service in M2 are actually below X0 but are constrained to be 
at that level for considerations unrelated to the consumer surplus or efficiency considerations. It 
is assumed that X0 is set by policy considerations external to the considerations implicit in the 
economic efficiency approach. The lump sum charges tm are assumed to be levied on M 1 only 
and it is also assumed that these charges are constrained to be no more than would cause the 
consumer to refuse service completely. 
The analysis will proceed to explore the two cases of interest, where no lump sum charge is 
levied and the case in which a constrained lump sum charge is levied. The costs represented by 
the functions are those that were discussed in the previous sections. The A. s are LaGrangian 
multipliers associated with the constraints defined in equations and inequalities (1), (2), (3) and 
(4). The control variables are the Xm, S, A, and WR. These are used to determine the optimal 
prices and the associated optimal level of capital investment. Since all markets are served, they 
are all connected to the network backbone, the universal service requirement is explicitly 
incorporated. 
The equations defining optimality are as follow (where the' represents a denvative with respect 
to the obvious variable should more than one variable exist in the function): 
(5.1) Form E M 1 : 
p m - em' + A, A + A,s m - A,u + 'An (P m, Xm + Xm - em' ) = 0 
(5.2) Form E M2 : 
- e . + A + A m - A + 1 (- e . ) ~ 0 m S u'\rn: m 
(6) - cs' - :r.MI+M2 Asm +'An ( -es) = 0 
(7) - eA·- AA +'An c-eA·) = o 
WL' I , WL' • t (8) :r.MI+M2em zm - eWR + 'An (L.MI+M2cm zm - CWI! ) = 0 
These equations simplify as follow. The simplifications use assumptions that for all m E M1 , 
the optimal X is above X11 and for all m in M 2 the optimal X is exactly the minimum possible, Xo-
We then get 
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(9) Forme M1 : 
pm =em'+ cA'- Asm I (1 +Ax)- [J..x/ (1 +Ax)] pm' xm 
(10) - I:mE Ml Asm/ (1 +Ax)= cs' 
(11) 
These equations lead immediately to the following observation. 
OBSERVATION 5. Optimal pricing reflects both marginal cost and a contribution to the 
common costs related to system capacity (the peak load form of joint production). 
Equation (9) says that the price of the service can be viewed as having four parts. The first is the 
local marginal cost of adding the local traffic. The second is the marginal cost of administration. 
Notice that this magnitude is the full marginal cost of administrative work for the level of 
activity itself. The third is a contribution to the capacity of the network backbone as will be 
defined by equation (10), and the forth is the subsidy factor created by the condition that the 
LEC make zero profits. The negative signs only reflect the fact that the multipliers in the 
constrained maximum problem are scaled negative. Equation (10) shows that the contribution to 
the capacity of the network backbone is calculated through the traditional sum of values 
characteristic of public goods provision. Again, the negative simply reflects a scaling factor. 
OBSERVATION 6. Optimal prices in each market do not directly reflect the cost saving to that 
local market from the design of the optimal network. The need to cover this cost is system wide 
and so it is reflected only in the subsidy factor markup, the magnitude of which is governed by 
the elasticity of demand. 
First, note that equation (9) contains no network backbone variables associated directly with one 
of the cost components from which the price is computed. The insight for Observation 6 is 
found in Equation (II), which indicates the calculation of a cost of a different kind. It says that 
the optimal network architecture involves a balancing of the cost of constructing the background 
network backbone with the cost saving at the local levels from the configuration of the network 
backbone chosen. When adding the local markets there is a cost s~ving that is reflected in the 
choice of the network backbone. That is, there is a common cost that is incurred in the attempt 
to balance a .tradeoff between the development of the network backbone and adding the local 
markets. This cost has no direct component in the local market prices. Yet it must be covered 
and the Ramsey price formula indicates that it is covered in proportion to the elasticity of 
demand. 
It is important to notice that the solution to the above system of equations determines not only 
the optimal prices to be charged in each market, but also the choice of technology and the 
structure of the network. That is the choice of technology and the network design will be 
different under the universal service constraints than without these constraints. Typically the 
solution with universal service will involve more backbone intensive network. Thus the 
incremental cost of servicing a market will lower if the LEC deployed its network under the 
universal service constraint than they would be without the constraint. Ignoring this fact may 
IS 
make the LEC appear to be inefficient in some markets when in fact the network has been 
designed for overall efficiency subject to universal service. 
Equation (12), which follows, applies to the case in which a lump sum charge can be levied. It 
is found by taking the derivative of the maximization problem with respect to the variables tm 
and setting them equal to zero to determine the optimal level of lump sum charges. The 
expression is: 
Since Nm =t. 0 it follows that An = 0 . The expression captures the fact that lump sum charges are 
a more efficient way to collect the funds needed to cover overhead than are charges per unit as is 
implicit in the Ramsey approach. The consequences for the equations (5) through (10) are clear. 
If the lump sum charge option is available it is used and all other charges are based on the 
naturally applicable marginal costs with no "markup" to cover the potential losses because they 
are covered by the lump sum charges. If the lump sum charge is not levied then equation (12) 
does not apply and the other equations remain as they are written. 
In the absence of customer specific charges then the equation (12) is not satisfied and the other 
equations produce a Ramsey type result. That is, efficiency requires that each service's price 
should deviate from marginal cost in inverse proportion to its elasticity. This yields an 
immediate result. The service with the lower elasticity will be proportionately priced higher 
than marginal cost, than the other service. It also has immediate implications for entry as the 
following observation summarizes. 
OBSERVATION 7. A policy of marginal cost pricing to entrants that are able to resell the 
service in competition with the LEC is inconsistent with optimal pricing. 
The marginal cost of a service is measured by the first three terms on the right hand side of 
equation (9). These ~erms include the local cost, administrative cost and a capacity charge. If an 
entrant is free to buy access to the service at marginal cost, which it can then sell in competition 
with the LEC, then price competition will force this price to this measure of marginal co_st.5 The 
Ramsey "markup" is eliminated. The result will be that the contribution to the cost of the 
network backbone (which had the effect of reducing the local marginal costs) are not covered 
and the costs created by the universal service requirement are not covered. The key observation 
is that optimal prices will deviate from marginal cost in proportion to demand elasticity. Entry 
based on marginal cost is thus incorrect. Entry based on marginal cost will make the markups 
impossible to maintain. If entry is allowed then the demand from the entrant should be included 
in the price elasticity calculations and the subsequent optimal price calculations. The price 
charged the entrant should be subject to the "appropriate" markup, an issue that is explored in 
the next section. 
~ If the LEC is unable to compete because of price regulations then the contribution to common costs is still lost 
and the result is non optimal. 
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A special observation is needed to explain the issue of scope and the related issue of "bundling" 
services. Suppose the variable X is decomposed into two services Xb and X. with production 
relationships defined by Xb = Sb (Yb,Y.) and X.= S.(Yb ,Y.) as was discussed in Section 3. Of 
course it could be that Sb = s. so the service b could be viewed as "part" of service v similar to 
the classical notion of joint production in fixed proportions. Consider a simple welfare 
maximization problem 
(13) maximize: 
f'b Ph(qh) dqb + f'• P.(q.) dq.- Cb(Yb) - C.(Y.) + A.b(Xb-Sb (Yb,Y.))+A.. (X. -S.(Y. ,Y.)) +An 
(PbXb+P.X.- Cb(Yb)- C.(Y.)) 
where the variables have the natural interpretation from the discussions of the previous sections. 
In this problem the optimal prices satisfy the equations 
(14) Ph+ "-/0+"-n) = -VCI+"-n) Pb,xh 
(15) P. + \1(1+"-n) = -A,/(1+"-n) P:x. 
(16) -[A/(1+"-n)] dS/dYh- [A./(1+"-n)] dSJdYh= Cb' 
(17) -[A./(1 +An)] dSJdY.- [A./(1 +"-n)] dSJdY.= C.' 
An easy way to see the interpretation of the above equations is to notice that if the Ramsey 
constraint were removed (perhaps through lump sum levies) then "-n=O and Pb=-Ab an P.=-A.. so 
the second two equations, ( 16) and ( 17), simply say that the value of the marginal product of a 
resource facility must be calculated for each product for which the facility was used and summed 
over all such uses. This sum must equal the cost to the firm of acquiring more of the resource. 
The implications for the bundling of services is immediate. 
OBSERVATION 8. The "unbundling" of services and consequent pricing according to 
marginal cost can lead to inefficient results. 
An interesting case, which makes the point of the observation, exists when no Yb is used and Xh 
< Sh(Yh, Y.) . In this case equation ( 16) is an inequality and the constant Ah =0. So, in a sense Xh 
is provided at zero marginal cost. Nevertheless it is easy to show that the optimal price of Xh, Ph 
>0. That is, price is positive even though marginal cost is zero.6 
In summary the Ramsey pricing model suggests several difficulties with marginal cost pricing. 
First the existence of common costs suggests that uniform prices are generally non optimal. 
Charges also reflect "what the traffic will bear" because of the need to cover the common costs. 
This property is seen most starkly in the case in which marginal costs are zero, and still there 
should be some charge. Secondly, sales to a competitor at marginal cost will destroy the 
necessary markups required to cover common costs. Third, a policy of unbundling of services 
which are sold to an entrant at marginal cost suffers from the same problem. As a background 
property to this discussion it should be recalled that the costs to the LEC are generally developed 
on the assumption that the LEC must meet a US obligation. Thus the costs to the LEC are not 
the same as they would be if no such US obligation exists and thus are not the same as those of 
6 Since A, =0 one can deduce that P" =-/..,.I (I+/..,.) P" .. It follows that demand elasticity is less than zero from 
which it follows that price is positive even though marginal cost is zero. 
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an entrant. Consequently, costs measured according to the entrant are not necessarily the relevant 
ones for consideration. 
SECTION 6: ENTRY AND PRICING: OPERATIONAL POLICIES 
Entry in the local telephony market takes three basic forms. It would be prohibitively expensive 
to set up a complete competing local telephone network, so entry and competition will take other 
forms. The first is resale, where the entrant leases the LEC' s network and equipment and resells 
services, or packages of services to the end users. A second form of entry is "facility based" 
· entry, where the entrant uses some of its own equipment such as switches or dedicated lines and 
then requires interconnection to the LEC' s network. The third type of entry is pure "bypass," 
where the entrant connects the end user directly to a long distance company, bypassing the LEC 
and its interconnection fees. In the case of the first two forms of entry the policy debate centers 
on the charge that the entrant should pay to the LEC for the use of its facilities. In the later case 
the debate faces on the issue of should bypass be allowed. A secondary issue is, what type of 
price regulations should remain if entry is allowed and occurs. In particular, regulations may be 
relaxed to allow the LEC to cut its prices to meet competition, (known as "downward price 
flexibility"), and/or allow the LEC to raise prices in those markets that do not attract 
competition, (known as "rate rebalancing"). 
The debate over policy in the first two forms of competition reduces to the regulatory issue of 
the pricing that rule should be used to price interconnection and access to the LEC' s network. In 
this section we briefly review some of the policy proposals for setting access fees. For an 
additional treatment of these issues, see Baumol and Sidak ( 1994 ). 
The first proposed pricing rule is that access fees should be based on incremental costs. Thus an 
entrant would only be responsible for the incremental costs of serving a network segment, 
(whatever definition of incremental cost is used). The candidate definitions are IC' and IC" 
found in Section 4 above. 
A seconq approach to pricing entry is to base the price on distributed costs. Under this 
approach the entrant would have to pay the incumbent an access fee that covers both the 
incremental costs and some share of the common costs of the LEC's network, based on either the 
number of customers who use the entrants service. or the markets entered. In the context of the 
model this means that the entrant would have to pay an access fee equal to 
access fee (M markets)= DCm 
were DCm is as defined in Section 4. It must pay this in order to use the LEC's network for the 
market m. 
A third approach to pricing entry is the so called efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) 
developed by Baumol and Willig. For a detailed analysis see Baumol and Sidak (1994). The 
ECPR was designed specifically to deter opportunistic entry. In the model developed here the 
ECPR has a natural interpretation given the underlying technology. Under this approach the 
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amount paid by the entrant to the LEC is equal to the revenue lost by the LEC minus the cost 
savings of the LEC for not serving those customers. If a firm enters market m, and deploys its 
own technology to reach the customers, then its ECPR access fee depends upon the revenue that 
the LEC has been receiving from market m, Rm (Xm) , and the "incremental cost" IC" of the 
LEC, from serving that market. 
Before moving to the next section some general_ observations about these three policies are in 
order. 
OBSERVATION 9. Incremental cost pricing is subject to three practical problems. (i) Access 
fees are not sufficient to cover the common cost of the network backbone. (ii) Without 
downward flexibility of prices the policy of charging incremental cost can lead to "opportunistic 
entry" which can threaten the financial viability of the LEC and can be inefficient. (iii) A policy 
of incremental cost access fees removes incentives for the LEC to undertake efficient 
investments. 
The problem with the incremental cost approach is that the existing regulatory framework 
enforces pricing rules on the LEC that result in large cross subsidies. This means some market 
segments pay significantly more than cost, (under any definition), while other market segments 
pay significantly less. This results in two well known problems. First, the access fees are not 
sufficient to cover the costs of the system. Consider the case of entrants with the same 
technology as the LEC and zero interconnection costs. Then access fees will be zero and prices 
in each market will be driven by competition to cover just incremental cost. Thus the LEC fails 
to recover the fixed capital costs. Second, even if the LEC stays in business, without downward 
pricing flexibility, marginal cost pricing may lead to "opportunistic entry." That is, it creates an 
incentive for firms to enter those markets where regulations keep price above marginal costs, 
even if the entrant is inefficient, i.e., has higher costs than the LEC. In a market where the LEC 
is unencumbered by regulation and universal service commitments, then competition would 
result in the more efficient firm providing the service, but that is not the case given the 
constraints on the LEC that reflect other policy goals.- In the presence of these additional 
constraints then, after opportunistic entry, the outcome is socially inefficient and the financial 
viability of the LEC may be in doubt. 
The model also introduces a third problem, dynamic inefficiency. Incremental cost access fees 
destroy the LEC' s incentive to deploy the efficient network architecture. Consider investment in 
backbone fiber that Jowers the incremental cost of serving the entrant's markets. The LEC has 
no financial incentive to undertake such an investment because its revenues from the access fees 
will be correspondingly reduced. Thus the dynamic production efficiency is lost. 
Pricing access based on distributed costs is designed to solve the cost recovery problem, but -
because by definition it embodies some arbitrary averaging- it does not account for the 
incentives to enter markets. Indeed, the distributed cost access fees can also fail to recover 
enough revenue for the LEC to break even, and create incentives for opportunistic entry as we 
show in Section 7. 
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OBSERVATION 10. If entry is by resale or interconnection then under the ECPR, the LEC 
remains viable, only efficient entry is encouraged and equilibrium prices the Ramsey prices. In 
addition, the LEC has the correct incentives to deploy the efficient investment. However, if 
entry is pure bypass, equilibrium under ECPR will involve the LEC operating at a loss. 
By definition the ECPR ensures that the LEC will continue to cover its costs after entry. 
Additionally, under the ECPR there will only be efficient entry. That is, if the entrant is more 
efficient at serving some segment of the market than the LEC, then, after paying the ECPR, it 
will be profitable for the entrant to enter. However, if the entrant has higher costs, it will now be 
unprofitable to enter. Within the context of the Baumol and Willig's framework with the 
bottleneck as an intermediate good, the ECPR deters opportunistic entry. This property of 
deterrence appears to be present when the bottleneck is viewed as access to an activity with a 
public good property that stems from the network infrastructure provided by the LEC and 
moreover, unlike the other approaches, it preserves the LEC' s incentive to deploy the efficient 
network. 
The ECPR can·be used to decentralize the social optimum as follows. In equations 6-11 we 
solved for the regulators optimum, that is, how to maximize the consumers' welfare subject to 
the constraints of universal service and that the system covers its costs, i.e. the LEC remains 
financially viable. As usual the "shadow price" derived from the optimization problem can be 
used as market prices to guide decentralized firms to achieve the social optimum outcome. The 
resulting prices are the Ramsey prices.7 These prices then allow us to calculate the 
"contribution" of each market towards the coverage of the common costs and the public good of 
the backbone network. Such "market contributions" have a natural economic interpretation in 
terms of access fees. The entrant should be responsible for any incremental costs associated with 
the market segment that it enters and should make a payment to the LEC based on the public 
good aspect of the infrastructure. 
1 The proof of the claim is as follows. First consider entry by a reseJier. Thus the entrant uses the incumbent 
LEC's technology only. If the LEC charged above the optimal price in market m, then as by construction the 
Ramsey price is below the monopoly price, a reseller can enter, pay the LEC the entry fee equal to Em (Xm) and 
make a profit by charging a small amount above the optimal price. Thus this cannot be an equilibrium. If the 
entrant charged a lower price then the entrant cannot cover the entry fee and the incremental cost, otherwise we 
contradict the Ramsey prices being a solution to the welfare maximization problem. Thus the entrant must charge 
at least the Ramsey price and the LEC can charge no more. The equilibrium prices must be the Ramsey prices, 
and the outcome is efficient. 
Now suppose a firm enters and deploys its own technology to market m. The LEC thus can exit the market and 
save [Cm(Nm,Xm) + Cmwt.(Wm0 - Zm(WR))] while receiving the entry fee Em (Xm ). The LEC is indifferent between 
entry and serving the market. Furthemore. by the definition of the ECPR entry fee, the entrant will only enter if it 
can service the market at a lower incremntal cost than the LEC. Again, in order to win customers, the entrant 
cannot charge more than the Ramsey price, and so if there is entry then the consumers will face a potentiaiiy 
lower price. If there are several potential low cost entrants then competition among them will force the price down 
to average cost given the entry fee. 
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An additional feature of the ECPR, is that it also recognizes the public good nature of the 
network backbone. That is, as an increase in the capacity of the network through improving 
transport, switching, or enhancements, (Yc, Y w' and Y. ) enhances the revenue capacity of the 
entrant, then the entrant should pay the LEC for such capacity so that, at the margin, the LEC 
has the financial incentives to deploy the efficient level of capacity in the network. But by 
examining the formula above, this is what the ECPR achieves. Consider the LEC' s decision to 
deploy a marginal increase in feeder plant. If the LEC deploys a unit more feeder, it's cost will 
go up by that amount, and the benefits are the marginal savings on incremental costs in those 
markets it serves, plus the increase revenues from the change in access fees equal to the amount 
of the incremental cost savings in the entrant's markets. Thus, if the correct marginal incentives 
· exist, the LEC will deploy resources in the network back bone until the sum of the marginal 
benefits is equal to the marginal cost, and so deploy the efficient network. The reasoning is 
consistent with our intuition about the public goods problem. When a properly regulated LEC is 
the single provider of a service there is, by definition, no public goods problem, and so it will 
invest in infrastructure efficiently . Entry can occur as an opportunity to "free ride," on the 
public good, and thus the long run equilibrium with entry would be inefficient. However, if the 
ongoing access fee is (net) revenue neutral to the LEC, then this restores the LEC's financial , 
incentives and so will not distort the infrastructure investment decisions of the LEC away from 
economic efficiency. 
Efficient investment requires a correct form of incentives. That the ECPR provides the correct 
incentives is illustrated by the following example. Suppose there are four markets A,B,C, and D 
located at the comers of a rectangle of length ~3 and width 1. Figure 4 contains two possible 
network architectures. Topology 1 has no network backbone. It utilizes only distribution lines 
that connect markets to a central switch. Assume that the cost of the distribution lines equals 
distance of the line, which is 1 for each line in this example. The total cost of deploying a 
network of topology 1 is thus (1 + 1 +I+ 1 + Switch Cost)= ( 4+switch cost). Topology 2 has a 
network backbone of length ~3 that connects two SAl. Each SAl is connected to two markets 
by distribution lines of length .5 each. Assume that the SAl cost nothing and that the cost of the 
11etwork backbone is equal to length. Thus the total cost of deploying a network of topology 2 is 
(~3+.5+.5+.5+.5+ switch cost)= (3.72+switch cost). 
Notice that topology 2 is the efficient network topology that should be deployed. However, 
consider an entrant in Market A. If the entrant pays only incremental cost to connect market A, 
the LEC's profits are (where Rev(x) is the revenue from markets x and sc represents switch 
cost): 
topology 1 profits= Rev(B,C,D)-(3+sc) 
topology 2 profits= Rev(B,C,D)-(.J3+ 1.5+sc)= Rev(B,C,D)-(3.22+sc) 
Notice that the profits from topology 2 are less than the profit from topology 1. The LEC will 
choose to deploy topology 1. Therefore, if the LEC anticipates that the entrant will enter market 
A and pay only an interconnect charge based on incremental cost, then the LEC will deploy the 
inefficient topology. Note that the level of inefficiency is exacerbated by the network investment 
of the entrant. 
Now, suppose the entrant is charged the ECPR as an access fee for entering market 1. According 
to the ECPR, the access fee will be the foregone revenues minus the incremental cost, which will 
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depend upon the choice of topology. The ECPR is [Rev( A)- 1] if topology 1 has been chosen 
and it is [Rev( A) - .5] if topology 2 has been chosen. The LEC profits are: 
topology 1 profits =Rev(B,C,D)-(3+sc )+Rev(A)-1 = Rev(A,B,C,D)-( 4+sc) 
topology 2 profits=Rev(B,C,D)-(1.72 +1.5+sc)+Rev(A)-.5= Rev(A,B,C,D)-(3.72+sc). 
A B A B 
c D 
TOPOLOGY 1 TOPOLOGY2 
FIGURE 4 
Since the profits from deploying topology 2 are higher than the profits from deploying topology 
1, the efficient topology is chosen. The proper investment is deployed and the efficient network 
is built. 
Thus, of the three approaches outl.ined above, the ECPR is the only method consistent with the 
optimal pricing approach. However, it does not solve all of the policy issues in the presence of 
universal service. In particular, as is stated in Observation 10, one must consider the case of pure 
bypass. Here, by definition, there is no interconnection and thus no interconnection fee. The 
LEC will necessarily make a loss since entrants will take the profitable markets leaving the LEC 
with no source of funds to cover costs imposed by a universal service obligation. Therefore, in 
the presence of these issues, policies that supplement the ECPR with a universal service fund 
must be considered. However, the existence of such a fund, and its implementation creates an 
interdependence that further complicates the determination of the optimal access fee. We 
explore in the next section. 
25 
7. UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY REGIMES 
The basic requirement of universal service is that the network be configured such that each 
person can have access to the network if he so desires. Given such a configuration there may be 
markets in which revenues cover incremental costs but do not cover the distributed · 
(fixed/common) costs allocated to that market. Thus any type of universal service scheme must 
identify those groups of consumers that are in this last category (of revenues not covering both 
incremental and distributed fixed/common costs) and find some transfer mechanism to allocate 
revenues from other markets in such a way that costs are covered. In the context of a single 
service provider this is relatively easy. The firm is responsible for the cost of the network and 
earns all the revenue; so, as long as total revenues cover total costs then the firm can provide 
universal service. However, when there is entry, the universal service scheme must decide the 
following : who is obliged to meet the carrier of last resort obligations; how are the 
discrepancies between revenues and cost to be made up; should the entrant be allowed to act as 
carrier of last resort in those markets it enters, and if so what type of funding should the entrant 
be eligible for. For a detailed example of a universal service scheme see Noam (1993). 
In the following we consider three possible universal service regimes. The first regime is where 
the LEC is the only Carrier of Last Resort. The LEC alone must meet the obligation of serving 
all potential customers. Entrants are free to enter markets after paying the access fee to the LEC, 
but are not expected to offer universal service. They are thus free to selectively offer their 
services to specific customer types. 
The second regime is based on current proposals to rebate the carrier, based on the number of 
recognized high cost customers it serves. We model this scheme as follows. First those 
customers that would need to be subsidized are identified. Secondly a per customer subsidy 
number is calculated. This could be obtained either from the historical costs of the LEC 
providing universal service, or obtained via an auction where the players announce the subsidy 
they would require to meet the carrier of last resort obligation. Finally, the entrant decides which 
markets to enter, and if it enters a market eligible for a subsidy then it must provide service to 
everyone in that region, and earns the given subsidy. If no one enters a market then the LEC 
continues to provide service and collects the subsidy. The funds for the subsidy are collected via 
a tax on each customer that a carrier serves. 
The final scheme we consider involves geographic de-averaging. That is, as before the set of 
customers that would have to be subsidized are identified, but now the subsidy is targeted to, and 
tailored for each specific region. Again, the regional specific subsidy could be based on the 
historical differences between the revenues of that regional and its costs, or be obtained via an 
auction where bidders would announce the region specific subsidy they require to serve a 
specific region. 
Below entry into a stylized LATA, depicted in Figure 1, is modeled under alternative regulatory 
regimes. We consider three types of access fees that the entrant would have to pay to the LEC, 
(i) incremental cost only, (ii) distributed cost, (iii) the Baumol-Willig Efficient Component 
Pricing Rule, (ECPR). We consider three types of universal service regimes, (i) only the LEC is 
bound by the universal service requirement, (ii) the entrant can participate in the universal 
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service scheme by selecting any group of customers and is reimbursed on a per customer basis, 
and (iii) deaveraged scheme, where a firm may draw on the universal service fund, but the 
subsidy is specific to each geographic market. 
Our findings may be stated succinctly in the following observation: 
OBSERVATION 11. The only policy combination that jointly ensures, (i) consumers do not 
loose from entry , (ii) there is only efficient entry, i.e., there is entry only when the entrant can 
service a segment of the market at lower cost than the LEC, (iii) universal service and (iv) the 
economic viability of the LEC, is the combination of using the ECPR fee combined with a 
deaveraged universal service fund. 
The observation can best be illustrated by example. Consider a system with 10 geographic 
markets such as the one in Figure 1. The first five markets each have a population of size 5, and 
are labeled, A, B, C, D, and E. The other 5 markets are rural, each has a population of size 1. 
Collectively the rural markets will be labeled market F. " 
Consumers are modeled as follows: each consumer has a value of being connected to the 
system and making local calls, and a demand for a given number of toll calls. Every consumer 
values a toll call at $2 , but consumers differ in the number of calls that they wish to make. 
Markets' demands thus differ in the number of calls a consumer makes and the number of 
consumers. For markets A, B, C, D and E, each consumer values being connected at $20. In 
market A, each consumer values local connectivity at $20 and wishes to make 9 calls that he 
values at $2 each. Thus, total consumer valuation in market A is 5x(20+(9x2))=$190. 
Similarly, in market B there are five customers each of which are willing to pay a connection 
charge of $20 for a total connection valuation of $100. Each customer in market B wishes to 
make 5 toll calls at $2 each yielding a total value of toll of $50. Thus the total valuation in 
market B is $150. In market C each customer wants to make 3 toll calls so the total valuation is 
$130. In market D each customer wants to make 2 toll calls so the total valuation is $120; and, 
in market E the one call that each customer wants to make produces a total valuation of $110. In 
each of the markets in F, people only value the connection at $18 and each will only make one 
tall that they value at $2. Thus, the total consumer value in market F is 5x$20 = $100. 
The costs of the incumbent LEC are as follows. Given the capacity required to handle the traffic 
in the system, ( the variable X in the general model), there is a fixed common cost, e.g., central 
switching and fiber backbone, of $100. This is the cost expended for the resources discussed in 
Section 5. The incremental costs of markets A, B, C, D, and E, are $100 for each market. The 
incremental cost of each rural market in F is $30, a total of $150. The total cost of a system that 
provides universal service is thus $100 +(5x$1 00) +$150= $750. 
Observe that a profit maximizing firm, or a regulator interested in economic efficiency, would 
not connect any of the rural markets, since, for each consumer the incremental network cost, 
$30, is greater than the consumers total value of getting the service for free, $20. As was stated 
above, policy of universal service is founded in some other criteria. Note however, that the 
system a whole is viable. That is, if the whole system is built, the total consumer valuation is 
$800, and total cost is $750 leaving a social surplus of $50. 
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The regulator's optimum can now be detennined, assuming that the LEC is the single service 
provider. Assume that there is no deaveraging, i.e. that the same tariff must be offered to all 
consumers in all markets. Assume further that there is universal service and that no subsidy 
from outside the industry is available. In this case, solving for the optimum tariff, i.e., the one 
that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus subject to the LEC breaking even, yields the 
following tariff: there is a hookup charge of $18, and toll calls are $2 each. Table 1 contains the 
example revenues and costs. 
Total revenues $750, exactly covers total costs .. Note, however, the network has enough 
capacity to handle all the traffic, so the marginal cost of a toll call is zero. Thus, in a sense, there 
is a cross-subsidy from toll to local fees. Moreover, the accounting costs of each market, 
computed using distributed costs, can be computed as follows. Each market is responsible for 
its incremental costs plus its share (fixed cost divided by the number of markets) of the fixed 
cost. That is, share of fixed costs =$1 00/10 markets =$1 0 per market. Since revenues in E are 
only $100, and market E's cost share is $100 +$10=$110, then its implicit subsidy is $10. For 
the rural markets, F, the total cost share is 5 x ($30 +$10)=$200. However, revenues are only 
$100. Thus, markets F are being subsidized $100 as a group. Total market cross subsidies 
amount to $110. The five people in market E are being subsidized and the five people in 
markets Fare subsidized so when measured per capita, there is a subsidy of $11 in the 
subsidized markets ($11 0/10 people). 
TABLE 1: EXAMPLE DEMANDS AND COSTS 
Market Hook up Toll revenue Total Incremental network Total 
revenue costs cost cost 
A 5 X $18 = $90 45 X $2 = $90 $180 100 
B 5 X $18 = $90 25 X $2 =$50 $140 100 
c 5 X $18 = $90 15 X $2 = $30 $120 100 
D 5 X $18 = $90 lOx $2 = $20 $110 100 
E 5 X $18 = $90 5 X $2 = $10 $100 100 
F 5 X $}8 = $90 5 X $2 = $10 $100 150 
Total $750 650 100 750 
A universal service fund mechanism can be conceptualized in the following way. Rather than 
allow the subsidies to exist implicit in the prices, an alternative way to fund the· system would be 
for the LEC to pay into a universal service fund (USF) and draw on the fund for each subsidized 
customer. The subsidized customers are the I 0 individuals in markets E and F. If the fund was 
required to balance exactly and meet the net cost of the subsidy exactly, then the contribution 
would be $5.50 per customer. To calculate this figure, let the contribution per customer be x, 
there are 30 customers so total revenues would be 30x. However, there are I 0 residents in the 
two subsidized markets E and F; so, the contributions there must be netted out in order to obtain 
the total net subsidy of $110. Thus, the equation 30x- /Ox=$1 10 must be satisfied and it follows 
that x=5.50. This computation generates 30 x$5.50 =$165.00 in revenue for the fund. Since 10 
consumers are being subsidized, the total of $165 would amount to a $16.50 subsidy for each 
such consumer. The net fund dispersal per capita is. then, $16.50- $5.50 =$11, which is exactly 
the average cost of the subsidy. 
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One could imagine the LEC revealing that it will provide universal service in return for an $11 
per capita subsidy in the required areas. Or one could imagine the LEC announcing this number 
in an auction where the lowest bidder gets to provide universal service. Of course, if the LEC is 
the sole service provider, then it is the only one contributing to and drawing on the fund so such 
calculations amount to mere accounting identities. However, things are different once the long 
run perspective with entry is considered. 
In the following examples the three different access fee requirements are considered under both 
conditions with and without the universal service fund as outlined above. Since entry is designed 
to benefit consumers, the existing tariff is assumed to remain in place. This, of course, means 
that entrant can obtain no more revenue from each market than the number listed in the Table 1 
above. The following questions are asked for each regulatory regime: is it profitable for the 
entrant to enter even if it has no cost advantage over the LEC, and, if entry is profitable, then 
what are the economic consequences of entry for the LEC and universal service. 
The first example is a policy in which there is no universal service fund mechanism and the 
entrant is charged the incremental cost of the market it serves. There are no hookup costs in the 
example. If the entrant enters market A, for example, then the entrant would then be responsible 
for the incremental costs of that market i.e. $100. If the entrant can service market A for less 
than $1 00 then the LEC can reduce its costs by $100. If resale is allowed then under this scheme 
the entrant can buy or lease that segment of the network from the LEC for $100 and earn the 
revenue from market A. If there is no USF mechanism, then even if the entrant has no cost 
advantage he will enter markets A, B, C and D. In the case of A, the entrant can earn $180 in 
revenues and only incur $100 in costs (by paying the LEC incremental cost for the service), thus 
there will be entry. Similarly, in market B revenues are $140 and incremental costs are only 
$100, thus there will be entry. Markets C and D present similar opportunities. This leaves the 
LEC with markets E and F. Its total revenues are thus $100 +$100 =$200, and its costs are $100 
+ $100 + $150 =$350. Thus the LEC makes a Joss of $150. This system is not economically 
viable. 
Now consider the same policy of charging incremental cost as an access fee .but with the 
universal service fund in place. Presumably, the fund works as discussed previously: every 
service provider has to contribute into the fund based on the number of customers it serves. The 
LEC has announced that it will provide universal service in return for a payment of $11 per 
customer in the designated high cost markets. E and F. Under the universal service fund 
mechanism an entrant can also enter these markets and obtain a net $11 per capita subsidy. In 
this case to enter market A, B. Cor D. the entrant will have to contribute 5 x $5.50 = $27.50 to 
the fund per market. This means that entry is now profitable in markets A and B. The fund has 
deterred entry in markets C and D. However the entrant now has an incentive to enter market E. 
If it enters market E its costs will be the network segment cost plus the USF contribution, $100 
+ $27.50 =$127 .50, but revenues are $100 +$82.50 (5 x $16.50 from the universal service fund). 
Thus the entrant makes a net profit of $55. The LEC is thus left serving markets C, D and F, 
from which its total revenues are $120 + $I I 0 +$1 00 + $82.50= $412.50. Total costs are $100 + 
$100 + $100 + $150 + $82.50= $532.50. Thus the LEC makes a net Joss of $120. The system 
is not sustainable. 
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Now consider the case in which the entrant has to contribute towards the (distributed) cost of the 
public good segment of the network. Assume that there is no universal service mechanism in 
place and that entrant is charged the incremental cost of the market plus the distributed cost of 
the market. That is, the entrant has to assume the incremental costs of a particular market and 
pay $10 =$1 00110 for each market, i.e. its share of the fixed cost. This will now deter inefficient 
entry in market' D. However, there will still be entry in markets A, B, and C. This leaves the 
LEC with markets D, E, and F. The LEC's costs are now $100 +$100+ $100 +$150 =$450. 
LEC revenues are $110 +$1 00 +$1 00 + $30= $340. Thus the LEC loses $110. The system is not 
viable. 
The next case is one in which a universal service mechanism is in place and the entrant is 
charged a fee equal to the incremental cost plus the distributed cost of the market. With the USF 
in place then entry is still probable in markets A, B, and C, but, in addition the fund now creates 
an incentive to enter market E. In market E the entrant's costs are incremental cost+ distributed 
cost+ contribution to the fund (for market E consumers)= $100 +10 +$27.50= $137.50; but, 
revenues are $100 +$82.50, leaving a profit of $45. The LEC' s costs for the two markets it 
serves are fixed cost ($100) + incremental cost ($100 + $150) + USF charges for 10 customers 
($55)= $405.00. LEC revenues are market revenue ($110 +$100) +distributed cost access fees 
($40) + USF disbursements for D and F ($82.50)= $332.50. Thus, the LEC loses $72.50, again 
the system is not viable. 
Consider now the efficient component pricing rule advocated by Baumol and Willig. In the 
absence of the USF scheme an entrant would have to pay the LEC an access fee equal to the 
forgone LEC revenues minus the LEC cost savings. Thus, for example, to enter market A, an 
entrant will have to pay an access fee of $180-$1 00=$80. Thus the ECPR fee ensures that entry 
will occur only if the entrant can serve that segment of the market at a lower incremental cost 
than the LEC. Moreover, the access fee is designed to be net revenue neutral to the LEC, thus 
the LEC will always break even no matter which markets entry occurs. 
l)nder ECPR with a USF mechanism in place problems can still exist. Now, suppose that an 
entrant will have pay the ECPR fee plus the USF fee. In this case the fee combination may deter 
entry even when it is efficient. For example suppose that an entrant can run market A with an 
incremental cost of $90. Thus it is more efficient than the LEC iri this network segment. The 
costs of entry are now $90 + $80 + $27.50 = $197.50. Total revenues are $180. Thus the firm 
will not enter. In addition the USF mechanism encourages inefficient entry. Consider an entrant 
with no cost advantage entering market E. For market E the ECPR fee is $100-$100 =0. The 
entrants costs are thus $100 +$27 .50 =$127 .50. Entrant revenues are $100 +$82.50, yielding a 
profit of $55. If there is no other entry in the system, then the LEC must be making all the 
remaining contributions to the USF and so this entrant's profit is of course a net loss to the LEC 
of $55. Thus again the system is not sustainable. 
The key point to be gained from the last example is that the interaction between the access fee 
and the USF mechanism alters the incentives to enter markets. This interaction may both deter 
efficient entry and promote inefficient entry. The root of the problem is the geographic 
averaging implicit in the USF mechanism. If the USF funding mechanism allows any industry 
participant to act as a carrier of last resort, and if the carrier is reimbursed based on a statewide 
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average or per capita formula and is free to choose the segment of the market it wants to enter, 
then the results could be both inefficient and impair the economic viability of the LEC, even if 
we have in place an access fee scheme designed to encourage efficient entry. 
This last observation leads to the conclusion that any universal service funding mechanism must 
involve geographic deaveraging of the subsidy, when there are significant cost differences. That 
there are significant cost differences across markets has strong empirical support, for example, 
see Maher (1993). This subsidy should not be per capita but rather, as far as possible, the 
subsidy should be geographically based, and reflect the particular cost differences of the region. 
In the example that was used above, appropriate modification requires both modification of the 
ECPR to take account of the USF contribution, and the deaverage of the subsidy payment. 
Thus, the formula to determine the efficient component access price should be, the change in the 
LEC' s revenue minus the change in its costs, minus the change in the LEC' s universal service 
commitment. In addition the subsidy formula would now be, whoever provides service in 
market E receives a payment of $37.50, or $7.50 for each customer in that market and the 
subsidy for serving a rural market is now $25.50, and for all5 markets in F, $127.50. In this 
case the fund outlays still exactly cover costs, and the revenues from each market exactly cover 
its accounting costs. Moreover the entry fee plus universal service contribution sum to the 
ECPR fees without a USF mechanism, ensuring entry will occur only when the entrant is more 
efficient. 
In this example the scheme is logically equivalent to the ECPR. However, when there is a 
dynamic investment problem with a public goods aspect, the ECPR, based on historical 
observations of revenues can lead to an under provision of network upgrades due to the public 
good nature of the network infrastructure. Some upgrades may be socially beneficial and 
generate enhanced earnings for the industry as a whole, but, given entry, undertaking the 
upgrade may not be possible for the LEC if the payment it receives from the entrant is based on 
the smaller historical revenue base. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A policy of competition in local telephone markets involves relationships among technoiogies 
and regulations that are not fully reflected in the literature. Entry and threats of entry have 
implications for the structure of investments in the technology that governs both the nature of the 
network backbone and scope of services offered in markets. The facts of continuous 
technological advancements and population growth make new investments and capital 
deployments a constant phenomena. Regulations, in the light of competition, can have a major 
impact on the forms of investment that are undertaken. The body of the paper addresses some of 
the issues. 
The first two sections of the paper provided a summary of policy objectives and instruments that 
are used throughout the paper. The third and fourth sections of the paper develop a model that 
is used to demonstrate that the regulatory objectives and instruments are closely related to the 
nature of the production functions and associated cost functions. In particular a policy of 
universal service (US), operates like a constraint on the system that can have influences on the 
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entire network configuration. As a result, the costs of the LEC and the costs of entrants will 
differ (Observation 1) even though they might otherwise be equally efficient or have access to 
exactly the same technology. 
The model can be used to identify several key properties of technology that suggest the 
importance in common costs associated with investments (Observation 2). The model suggests 
that there are two dynamic efficiency problems of selecting the right input mix and network 
structure. These two efficiency issues are unlike the case of purely "sunk" common costs, that 
are well recognized in the literature, and for which the only economic issue is how to recover the 
costs. First, the network backbone, such as feeder plant, has a public goods aspect in that the 
more backbone that is deployed the lower are the incremental costs associated with an individual 
market. Secondly, as new services become possible there is a joint product issue concerning 
network upgrades. As both of these features are systemic properties of the network, the type of 
network architecture and the technology that is deployed depends critically on the universal 
service and other regulations. In particular universal service tends to support a heavier 
investment in the backbone technology and a more centralized network. This tends to increase 
the importance of common costs over incremental costs (Observation 3). 
Operational cost concepts, developed to implement policy, should recognize inherent 
interrelationships. That is, the choice of technology and the observed level of incremental and 
common costs, depend on the regulatory framework itself (Observation 4). Moreover, the model 
establishes that the true cost of universal service is not the sum of the difference between the 
incremental cost of serving a market and the revenues from that market, summed over those 
markets where this figure is positive, but rather, is a cost imposed on the whole system, 
(Observations 5 and 6). If the LEC is the sole service provider bound by universal service then 
the network design problem would have a different solution than it would if the LEC designed 
the network as the sole service provider or if it was designed under the assumptions of 
competition. An implication of this is that the naive approach of comparing incremental costs 
and revenues fails to recognize the public good aspects of investment in the network and so falls 
short of measuring the economic cost of universal service to the LEC. Thus, policies based on 
the naive approach of measuring the cost of universal service on incremental costs alone could 
grossly underestimate the cost and thus would not provide a large enough universal service fund 
should one be established. 
Given the model of the technology, it is possible to solve the regulator's problem of finding the 
optimal prices to maximize economic efficiency subject to both universal service and the 
continued economic viability of the LEC. This solution yields modified Ramsey optimal prices 
that could be used as a guide to evaluate the performance of alternative regulatory regimes 
associated with universal service funding mechanisms and entry regulations. The analysis shows 
that the issues of entry and universal service are highly interconnected. That is, a feasible 
universal service plan cannot be formulated independent of the conditions on entry, and the rules 
for efficient entry cannot be determined independent of the universal service scheme. For these 
reasons the two problems should be considered jointly. A policy that attempts to approach them 
sequentially as opposed to simultaneously could be subject to systemic failures. 
Several possible entry and universal services regimes are studied. The first observation is that a 
policy of using incremental cost as the basis of access is highly problematic. This is the case 
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with or without a universal service funding mechanism. In particular, using incremental cost as 
a basis for resale could bankrupt the LEC and undoes the ability to exploit different elasticities 
to cover the common costs efficiently, (Observation 7). When the entrant can use its own 
facilities, incremental cost based access fees could lead to inefficient entry, causing the failure of 
the LEC to be viable and destroying the incentives to deploy the efficient network, (Observation 
8 and Observation 9). 
The observations have implications for a policy of "bill and keep" that is being considered in 
regulatory discussions. The policy suffers from the same problems as do the simple incremental 
cost pricing policies. The proposal is that if an entrant builds its own network and connects to 
the LEC then each service provider will just bill its own customers (those connected to its own 
system) for calls that are connected to the other network. There would be no interconnection 
charge or charge for terminating traffic. In the model presented in the paper the policy is 
equivalent to incremental cost based access pricing and so is problematic. Consider, for 
example, the case in which the entrant chooses to develop its network to target those customers 
for connection that initiate more calls than they receive. Without terminating traffic fees, or an 
access fee, the LEC will have to cover the investment cost of its network out of its remaining 
markets. The incentives for an efficient system are destroyed and if the entrant has targeted the 
customers of the LEC, the LEC might fail to remain viable. 
The model shows that if market entrants pay an entry fee to the LEC based on the Baumol-
Willig efficient component pricing rule, then inefficient entry is deterred and the LEC will 
continue to have the incentive to invest efficiently. However the ECPR alone will not raise 
enough revenue if there is pure bypass of the LEC's facilities or if the definition of universal 
service is changed to new services (Observation 1 0). 
The model suggests that there is a need for a universal service fund and it has implications about 
the size of a fund. The cost of universal service is imposed on the system as a whole, which 
includes investment in common costs. Moreover, the level of these investments depends on the 
universal service req.uirement itself. If policy makers want to ensure the ongoing viability of the 
LEC and ensure that over time the industry has the correct incentives to efficiently invest in 
infrastru.cture, both to deploy timely network upgrades and new services, then the universal 
service fund must stand ready to fully compensate the LEC for the investments should entry 
remove some of its markets. 
The problem is most radically illustrated by the "scorched earth" proposal that would have past 
investments considered as sunk cost and not included in universal service calculations. A similar 
proposal called the "scorched node" policy would leave arteries in place but start at new 
switching. The relationships among such policies and the incentives of the LEC to invest in 
infrastructure are particularly relevant if the scope of universal service is of on-going concern 
and could be expanded in the future. A scorched earth policy or a scorched node policy removes 
incentives to build such infrastructure that provides broad benefits and therefore creates common 
costs. 
The revenue basis for a universal service fund should be as broad as is possible. In addition, the 
payment should be tailored to the costs of reaching the individual consumer or market as much 
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as is possible, (Observation 11). Even with the ECPR in place, a pro-rata subsidy pay-out based 
on the average cost of reaching high cost customers creates incentives for inefficient entry that 
could bankrupt the fund and/or the LEC. The combined policy should involve rate re-balancing, 
the ECPR and a de-averaged universal service fund. 
In summary, the problems of common costs are exacerbated by the existence of the universal 
service policies and these extend themselves beyond the problems associated with sunk costs. 
Specific features of the technology have a public goods property that must be acknowledged in 
any analysis of entry. A main conclusion is that there is a strong interconnection between these 
properties that must be acknowledged if policy failures are to be avoided. In the presence of a 
universal service requirement some regulatory feature like a universal service fund is necessary. 
However, subsidies paid out of the fund should be based on individual market conditions as 
much as possible, and should not embody the geographic averaging of costs. Access fees should 
be charged to market entrants using a version of the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) 
that must be suitably modified to account for interactions with the universal service fund. 
Finally the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC), must be allowed flexibility to adjust rates 
across markets after entry in a market, (rate rebalancing). In particular, a piecemeal approach to 
policy will be vulnerable to systemic failure. That is, there is a fundamental inconsistency among 
e.fficient component pricing, the universal service fund and geographic averaging of costs to 
establish both a uniform price, and universal service fund subsidies. If geographic deaveraging 
is implemented, with the consequent differences in prices, then the efficient component pricing 
and the universal service fund can operate together to foster efficient entry and the maintenance 
of the local exchange carrier. If geographic averaging is present then the compatibility and 
associated efficiency may be lost. 
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